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INTRODUCTION
An important question in the context of international trade
liberalization, and specifically in the context of the World Trade
Organization ("WTO") Agreements and the new round of WTO
negotiations launched by the Doha Ministerial, is the extent to which
the existing international trade rules accommodate measures that
government authorities adopt in order to protect health, safety, and/or
the environment ("HSE"), but which otherwise violate one or more
of a Member's trade commitments. A key issue is the extent to which
government authorities are justified in taking a precautionary
approach when they adopt unilateral HSE protection measures.
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Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") 1994' recognizes that the protection of HSE may, under
certain conditions, justify a measure that otherwise violates a
Member's obligations.2 In addition, the WTO Agreement on Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures ("SPS Agreement") 3 sets out a series of
requirements that must be satisfied in order for certain HSE measures
to qualify as WTO-compatible. The underlying concern of these
provisions is that such measures may constitute unjustified obstacles
to trade. Recent WTO discussions about expanding recognition of a
so-called "precautionary principle" reflect the same conflicting
interests. On one hand, there is an interest in the international rules
being deferential towards the approach a given Member takes to the
management of HSE risks. On the other hand, there is also an interest
in preventing new protectionist barriers from arising under the guise
of precaution.
All WTO Members theoretically have an equal interest in both
promoting deference to legitimate HSE measures and avoiding new
protectionist barriers. Nevertheless, those countries that rely more
heavily on exports of basic plant and animal products have a
particularly strong practical interest in ensuring access abroad for
their products. This is often the case for developing countries, which
already have a difficult time matching the resources of more
developed WTO Members in being able to defend their rights
vigorously under the Dispute Settlement Understanding.'
1. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M.
1125, 1144-54 (1994), Annex IA, Art. XX [hereinafter GATT 1994] (enumerating
the general exceptions to the Agreement, which allow contracting parties to adopt
and enforce certain measures as they deem necessary). Note that Article XX was
fully annexed under the GATT 1994.
2. See id. (noting that certain exceptions exist under which Members may
disregard a particular provision of the GATT 1994 if it is necessary to do so in
order to protect certain interests relating to heath, safety, and the environment).
3. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 6, 33 I.L.M. 1125. 1153 (1994). Annex IA [hereinafter SPS
Agreement].
4. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
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In this context, this author believes that developing countries havc
reason to be satisfied with the contents of the Ministerial Decision of
November 14, 2001, on Implementation-Related Issues and
Concerns ("Doha Implementation Decision")5 and the Ministerial
Declaration of November 20, 2001 ("Main Doha Declaration"). ' This
article explains the basis for this conclusion by first examining the
manner in which the WTO Standing Appellate Body ("SAB") has
thus far interpreted and applied Article XX of the GATT 1994 and
the SPS Agreement to various national measures ostensibly taken to
protect health, safety, or the environment.7 The focus of this analysis
is on the deference shown to a Member's precautionary approach.
This article then looks at the decisions from the Doha WTO
Ministerial against this background.
The conclusions of the present article are twofold. First, the WTO
Agreements, as interpreted and applied by the SAB, take an
appropriately deferential approach towards the legitimate public
policy concerns of WTO Members, including developing countries.
Any effort to push for a stronger role for a precautionary approach in
the WTO Agreements would undermine the delicate balance already
achieved to the particular detriment of developing countries' exports.
Second, the various implementation initiatives established in
conjunction with the Doha Ministerial should help developing
countries avoid becoming the victim of an arbitrarily precautionary
approach adopted by developed countries.
Disputes, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994), Annex 2 [hereinafter DSUJ.
5. WTO Ministerial Conference, Doha Implementation Decision - Related
Issues and Concerns, WT/MIN(01)/17 (Nov. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Doha
Implementation Decision].
6. WTO Ministerial Conference, Doha Ministerial Declaration,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/I (Nov. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
7. The present study looks in particular at Article XX of the GATT 1994 and
the provisions of the SPS Agreement because these rules have now been invoked
in a number of WTO disputes. Furthermore, this author believes that the pattern of
interpretation emerging with regard to these provisions will apply as relevant to the
parallel provisions of the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement ("TBT") and the
General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS").
[ 17:905
PRECA UTIONAR Y PRINCIPLE
I. PRELIMINARY COMMENT REGARDING
TERMINOLOGY: "PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE"
AND "PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH"
To define a "precautionary principle," proponents of its existence
often point to Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development:' "In order to protect the environment, the
precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according
to their capability. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason
for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation."9
The second sentence, which might be considered the essence of a
"precautionary principle," is striking for its use of a triple negative.
A slight rephrasing makes this triple negative more obvious:
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, theJact
that authorities do NOT have full scientific certainty shall NOT be used
as a reason for NOT taking prompt cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation.
By virtue of the second of the three negatives, this provision
removes a possible justification for government inaction (i.e., the
lack of full scientific certainty). This is important in a context where
government officials are held accountable for their decisions to act or
not to act, and could be liable for damages if they take action when
there are insufficient grounds for imposing measures (e.g., because
of insufficient scientific certainty). These considerations reflect two
fundamental principles of sound administration: 1) that a government
authority must give an adequately reasoned justification for its
actions; and 2) that it must not take arbitrary action.
In addition, removing the justification for inaction could serve to
justify action, and may even amount to a requirement of action if
8. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/5/Rev.l
(June 13, 1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874, 879 [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
9. Id. at Principle 15.
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other conditions are met. Certain international declarations take this
more active and normative approach to precautionary measures. For
example, the Ministerial Declaration of the Second International
Conference on the Protection of the North Sea"' states that "in order
to protect the North Sea from possibly damaging effects of the most
dangerous substances, a precautionary approach is necessary which
may require action to control inputs of such substances even before a
causal link has been established by absolutely clear scientific
evidence."'" The Ministers further agreed to "accept the principle of
safeguarding the marine ecosystem of the North Sea by reducing
polluting emissions of substances that are persistent, toxic and liable
to bioaccumulate at source ... even when there is no scientific
evidence to prove a causal link between emissions and effects ("the
principle of precautionary action")."2
While this Ministerial Declaration spoke of "the principle of
precautionary action," the Ministerial Declaration of the Third
International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea'" used
the term "the precautionary principle." Thus, the Third Conference's
Declaration states that signatories "will continue to apply the
precautionary principle, that is to take action to avoid potentially
damaging impacts of substances that are persistent, toxic and liable
to bioaccumulate even where there is no scientific evidence to prove
a causal link between emissions and effects."' 4
Regardless of the label used, the differences in the above
formulations are significant and have important implications for
evaluating a government's responsibility in a given situation. Thus,
stating that a lack of full scientific certainty cannot by itself justify
10. Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea, Nov.
24-25, 1987, 27 I.L.M. 835, 836 [hereinafter Second Conference].
I. Id. para. VII.
12. See id. para. XVI(I) (noting that the Members agree to utilize a
precautionary approach when dealing with pollution inputs to the North Sea via
rivers and estuaries of substances that are toxic and may accumulate).
13. Third International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea.
Ministerial Declaration, Mar. 8, 1990, 1 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 658, 662-73 (1990)
[hereinafter Third Conference l, available at
http://www.odin.dep.no/md/html/conf/declarationihague.html.
14. Third Conference, supra note 13, at pmbl. (describing one of the premises
upon which the participants will base their future work).
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inaction is very different from stating that action may be required
even where no evidence of a causal link exists. The Rio Declaration,
in effect, defines the limit at one end of the spectrum of scientific
certainty by stating that government authorities may be required to
act, even if there is not full scientific certainty. The Declarations
from the Conferences on the Protection of the North Sea go much
further in the opposite direction by stating that even in the absence of
any evidence of a causal link to a particular risk, government
authorities may be required to take precautionary measures.
In addition to observing that there are significant variations in the
formulation of a "precautionary principle," one might also ask
whether it is necessary to refer to a "precautionary principle" as
something distinct from a "precautionary approach," which is an
integral part of ordinary, everyday risk management. In this regard,
while international instruments relate primarily to government
action, or inaction, all societal actors, whether individuals,
companies, or governments, continuously carry out risk analysis and
management within their spheres of responsibilities as an integral
part of daily activities and planning for the future." Further, in the
international instruments cited above, as well as others, the terms
"precautionary principle" and "precautionary approach" seem
interchangeable. Similarly, in the EC - Beef Hormones Appellate
Body Report, 6 the SAB comments regarding the existence and
implications of a precautionary principle also indicate that this
principle is not distinct from the already used and recognized
precautionary approach to risk management. 7
15. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Report of
the Working Group in Harmonization of Regulatorn. Oversight it, Biotechnology,
C(2000)86/ADD2 (May 25, 2000), at 18-22 [hereinafter OECD Biotechnology
Report] (describing current approaches and experiences in environmental risk and
safety assessments); see also infra Annex A (setting forth the basic elements of
risk analysis).
16. WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Measure
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R,
WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter EC - Beef Hormones Appellate Body
Report] (resolving a complaint against the European Communities concerning the
use of certain hormones in their meat products, which violates the SPS
Agreement).
17. See id. paras. 123-25 (discussing the relevance of the precautionary
principle to the dispute in this case and concluding that the precautionary principle
2002]
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Regardless of whether there is a definable and distinct
"precautionary principle," such a principle, if it exists, clearly
involves a precautionary approach to risk management in situations
characterized by a lack of full scientific certainty as to the magnitude
of identified risks related to a given product. For this reason, the
present article speaks more generally of the application of a
precautionary approach for the adoption of governmental health,
safety, and environmental measures within the general international
legal framework of the WTO Agreements.
II. DEFERENCE TO A PRECAUTIONARY
APPROACH UNDER ARTICLE XX OF THE GATT
1994 AND THE SPS AGREEMENT
A. GENERAL
Because Article XX of the GATT 1994 has been in effect longer
than the SPS Agreement, and both contain provisions covering HSE
measures, the exact relationship between the two sets of provisions is
not immediately obvious. In this regard, Article XX appears
generally to cover HSE measures that a Member might adopt,
whereas the SPS Agreement relates only to specific types of
measures (i.e. sanitary and phytosanitary). There is potential overlap
does not override the provisions of the SPS Agreement). Within the EC legal
order, the European Court of Justice appears to take the same stance:
[1]t must be found that express reference to [the precautionary] principle (lid
not alter the account of the latest position as submitted to the [College of'
Commissioners]. The French Government had for several months been
putting forward arguments regarding the obligation to protect public health,
scientific uncertainty in the matter and problems connected with risk
management. The addition of the label "precautionary principle" to those
arguments added nothing to their content.
Case C-1/00, Commission v. Fr., 2001 E.C.R. 000, 2002 O.J. (C 44) 2, para. 83
(holding that France failed to fulfill its obligations under the EC Treaty by
maintaining its ban on British beef).
Also regarding the EC, see European Environment Agency, Late Lessons From
Early Warnings: The Precautionary Principle 1896-2000, 22 ENVTL. ISSUE REP'[.
(2001). This report, which purports to be a chronicle of various examples of the
application of a precautionary principle, or lack thereof, essentially chronicles the
application of a more or less precautionary approach.
[17:905
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between the subject matter of these provisions because, as noted in
the SPS preamble, that Agreement sets out rules for the application
of the provisions of GATT 1994 related to the use of SPS measures,
in particular Article XX(b), in conjunction with the Chapeau of
Article XX."8 This is reflected in the presumption expressed in
Article 2 of the SPS Agreement, that measures that conform with the
SPS Agreement also conform with obligations under the provisions
of GATT 1994.19
In addition, before needing to examine whether a measure is
justified under Article XX, there must be a finding that a violation of
one or more general GATT obligations has occurred. On the other
hand, a violation of an obligation under the SPS Agreement can arise
in the absence of a prior finding of a violation of a general GATT
obligation. 0 Once there is a finding of a violation of the SPS
Agreement, a Member may not argue to excuse the violation by
virtue of an exception under Article XX. This conclusion is based on
the preamble of the SPS Agreement and the General Interpretative
Note to Annex IA, the latter giving explicit precedence to the SPS
Agreement in case of a conflict with the provisions of the GATT
1994.21
18. See SPS Agreement, supra note 3, at pmbl. (describing the basic rights and
obligations under the SPS Agreement).
19. See id. Art. 2 (stating that sanitary or phytosanitary measures conforming to
the SPS Agreement likewise comply with provisions of GATT 1994, particularly
Article XX(b)).
20. See WTO Panel Report, European Communities - Measures Concerning
Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) Complaint by the United States,
WT/DS26/RIUSA, paras. 8.31-8.42 (Aug. 18, 1997) [hereinafter EC - Beef
Hormones Panel Report] (discussing the relationship between the SPS Agreement
and the GATT 1994). The European Community did not appeal this point and it
does not appear to be controversial.
21. See GATT 1994, supra note 1, at Annex IA, Art. XX ("I tin the event of
any conflict between a provision of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994 and a provision of another agreement in Annex IA to the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization ... the provision of the other
agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict."). The same general
observations apply to the relationship between the TBT Agreement and the GATS.
To remove potential overlap between the SPS and TBT Agreements, the TBT
Agreement expressly does not apply to measures that the SPS Agreement covers.
See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Final Act Embodying the Results
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL
AM. U. INTL L. REV.
B. ARTICLE XX OF THE GATT 1994
1. General
Article XX of the GATT 1994 sets forth a series of general
exceptions to Members' WTO obligations. The Article establishes
various unilateral measures that a Member may adopt without
breaching its obligations under the WTO Agreements.2 Some of the
types of measures which Members may adopt are those:
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;...
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement;... [and]
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption.
A WTO Member only needs to invoke one of the exceptions of
Article XX if the measure at issue violates one of the general GATT
obligations. In this regard, Members seeking to challenge a decision
to implement HSE risk reduction measures will most likely focus on
the Most Favored Nation ("MFN") and non-discrimination rules.2 3
When a defending Member invokes an exception under Article XX,
it must show a prima facie case that the measure in question falls
under that exception, and that it meets the requirements of the
Chapeau of Article XX.
24
INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 6, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1153
(1994), Annex 1A, art. 1.5 [hereinafter TBT Agreement].
22. See GATT 1994, supra note 1, Art. XX (enumerating the measures
allowed).
23. See GATT 1994, supra note I, Arts. I, 111 (stating the most-favored nation
and non-discrimination obligations placed on WTO Members).
24. See WTO Panel Report, United States Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia,
WT/DS58/RW, para. 5.138 (Oct. 22, 2001) [hereinafter U.S. - Shrimp Panel
Report: Article 21.5] (describing the way in which a Member can effectively use
the General Exceptions under Article XX).
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2. Requirements of the Exception in Question
To show that a measure falls under a given exception, the Member
must demonstrate a relationship between the measure and the
objective set out for that exception. Paragraphs (b) and (d) of Article
XX require that the measure in question be "necessary" to achieve
the policy objective, while item (g) only requires that the measure
"relate" to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.
Qualification of a measure under the Article XX (b) "necessary to
protect human life or health" standard requires that the WTO Panel
appraise the scientific evidence used as the basis for the measure at
issue.25 In other words, a Member needs to show that its measure
addresses a risk to human life or health as indicated by relevant
scientific evidence.26 As under the provisions of the SPS Agreement,
the risk may be evaluated in either quantitative or qualitative terms.27
A dispute settlement panel, as the trier of fact, evaluates the
sufficiency of the scientific assessment. The SAB will only interfere
with the panel's appraisal if it is "satisfied that the panel has
exceeded the bounds of its discretion, as the trier of facts, in its
appreciation of the evidence. ' 28 A panel need not reach a decision
25. See id., Art. XX (b); WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities
- Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products,
WT/DS135/AB/R, para. 115 (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter EC - Asbestos Appellate
Body Report] (confirming that Article XX (b) of the GATT 1994 allows a Member
to adopt a measure necessary to protect human life or health, even if this would
undermine another provision of the GATT 1994). In this Report, the SAB
disagreed with the Panel that considering evidence relating to health risks
associated with a product, as Article 111:4 of the GATT 1994 requires, undermines
Article XX (b), because Article 111:4 does not deprive Article XX (b) of its
effectiveness. See id.
26. See EC - Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 25, para. 115
(commenting that scientific evidence can allow a Member, under Article XX (b) of
the GATT 1994, to adopt or enforce a measure that is inconsistent with a WTO
rule if the measure is necessary to protect human health).
27. See id. para. 167 (recognizing that under Article XX (b) of the GATT 1994,
risks to human life or health can be evaluated in either quantitative or qualitative
terms); see also discussion, infra Part II.C.2.c. (discussing risk assessment of SPS
measures under the SPS Agreement).
28. WTO Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Safeguard
Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities,
WT/DS166/AB/R, para. 151 (Dec. 22, 2000) [hereinafter U.S. - Wheat Gluten
2002]
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under Article XX(b) on the basis of the preponderant weight of the
scientific evidence because of the recognition that a Member may
rely in good faith "on scientific sources which, at that time, may
represent a divergent, but qualified and respected, opinion."2" In
other words, "a Member is not obliged, in setting health policy,
automatically to follow what, at a given time, may constitute a
majority scientific opinion.""
Further, the SAB interprets the "necessity" requirement of items
(b) and (d) as involving a showing that no reasonably available
alternative exists that would achieve the same policy objective and
would be less restrictive of trade.3' The determination of whether a
suggested alternative measure is "reasonably available"3 requires
consideration of several factors, including:
Appellate Body Report] (acknowledging that an appellate body cannot find an
inconsistency with the Panel as a trier of fact simply because the appellate body
may have reached a different factual finding). The Appellate Body concluded in
this Report that it could not "interfere lightly" with the Panel's exercise of
discretion unless the Panel exceeded the bounds of its discretion. See id.; see also
EC - Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 25, para. 162 (noting that the
SAB may only challenge the Panel's decision upon a finding of abuse of
discretion, and nothing here suggested that the Panel exceeded the bounds of its
lawful discretion).
29. EC - Beef Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, para. 194
(relating the Appellate Body's belief that a risk assessment can include, and be
based upon, mainstream scientific opinion, as well as other divergent scientific
views).
30. EC -Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 25, para. 178.
31. See id. paras. 170-72 (describing the other cases in which the Appellate
Body defined the term "necessary" in reference to Article XX(b) and (d) of the
GATT 1994); WTO Appellate Body Report, Korea - Measures Affecting Imports
of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DSI61iAB/R, WT/DSI69/AB/R, paras.
157-80 (Dec. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Korea - Beef Appellate Body Report]
(examining in detail the word "necessary" in the context of Article XX, and
enumerating possible factors to consider when determining whether a measure is
"necessary").
32. See EC - Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 25, paras. 170-72
(discussing the factors that other Appellate Body reports considered when defining
the term "necessary"); see Korea - Beef Appellate Body Report, supra note 3 1,
paras. 157-80 (stating the factors to consider in reference to Article XX,
subsections (b) and (d), both of which use the word "necessary").
916 [17:905
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1) the difficulty of implementation of the alternative measure;
2) the accompanying impact of the alternative measure on imports and
exports;
3) the extent to which the alternative measure contributes to the
realization of the end pursued; and,
4) the extent to which the common interests or values pursued are vital or
important.
33
In U.S. - Shrimp, the SAB held that Article XX (g) requires an
examination of the relationship between the general structure and
design of the measure at stake and the policy goal it purports to
serve.34 The essential test is whether the means are reasonably related
to the ends in a "close and real" manner. 5 While the SAB in U.S. -
Shrimp did not examine the availability of alternative and less trade-
restrictive measures to determine whether Article XX (g) covered the
measure, the SAB did discuss the availability of other courses of
action to achieve the same policy goal within the context of the
requirements of the Chapeau. 6
33. Korea - Beef Appellate Body Report, supra note 31, paras. 163-66.
34. See WTO Appellate Body Report, United States Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter
U.S. - Shrimp Appellate Body Report], , paras. 136-37 (describing the proper
relationship as one of a "genuine relationship of ends and means").
35. See id. para. 141 (explaining that the relationship between the legislative
measure taken by the United States and the legitimate policy of conserving an
exhaustible and endangered species is close and real); see also VTO Appellate
Body Report, United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (April 29, 1996) [hereinafter U.S. - Gasoline Appellate
Body Report] (illustrating the substantial relationship between the Environmental
Protection Agency's baseline establishment rules and the conservation of clean air
in the United States).
36. See U.S.- Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 34, paras. 146-60
(examining the manner in which a measure is applied under the Chapeau of Article
XX); see also discussion infra Part lI.B.3.b. (discussing unjustifiable
discrimination and explaining that it is unacceptable for one Member country to
require others to adopt a measure to further a policy goal that does not take into
account specific conditions existing in various Member countries).
20021 917
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3. Requirements of the Chapeau
a. General Requirement of Good Faith in the Exercise of the
Basic Right to Determine the Level of Protection
In addition to the requirements of the individual exceptions, the
measures listed in Article XX must meet certain general criteria in
order to benefit from treatment as an exception. The Article XX
Chapeau provides that measures falling under one of the listed
exceptions must not be "applied in a manner which would constitute
a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade."37 As a general matter, the SAB
interprets the Chapeau as projecting both substantive and procedural
requirements in that "the application of a measure may be
characterized as amounting to an abuse or misuse of an exception of
Article XX not only when the detailed operating provisions of the
measure prescribe the arbitrary or unjustifiable activity, but also
where a measure, otherwise fair and just on its face, is actually
applied in an arbitrary or unjustifiable manner."38
In addition, the SAB considers that the Chapeau of Article XX
embodies the general treaty rule of application in good faith." One
application of this general principle "prohibits the abusive exercise
of a state's rights and enjoins that whenever the assertion of a right
'impinges on the field covered by [a] treaty obligation, it must be
exercised bona fide, that is to say, reasonably'."40 In the words of the
Appellate Body,
[The Chapeau] embodies the recognition on the part of WTO Members of
the need to maintain a balance of rights and obligations between the right
of a Member to invoke one or another of the exceptions to Article XX,
37. GATT 1994, supra note 1, Art. XX.
38. U.S. - Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 34. para. 160.
39. See id. para 158 (arguing that Article XX should be read as embodying the
general principles of international law).
40. Id. (quoting BIN. CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 125 (1953)).
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specified in paragraphs (a) to (j), on the one hand, and the substantive
rights of the other Members under the GATT 1994, on the other hand.
Further,
The task of interpreting and applying the Chapeau is, hence, essentially
the delicate one of locating and marking out a line of equilibrium between
the right of a Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the
rights of the other Members under varying substantive provisions.., of
the GATT 1994, so that neither of the competing rights will cancel out the
other and thereby distort and nullify or impair the balance of rights and
obligations constructed by the Members themselves in that Agreement.
The location of the line of equilibrium, as expressed in the Chapeau, is
not fixed and unchanging; the line moves as the kind and the shape of the
measures at stake vary and as the facts making up specific cases differ.42
With regard to health and safety measures, the SAB recognizes
that Article XX endorses the fundamental right of each Member to
set the level of protection that it deems appropriate for its
population.43 At the same time, the chosen level of protection has
implications for the manner in which the Member selects a measure
to attain that protection, and for application of that measure in
practice.
b. No Arbitrary or Unjustifiable Discrimination
Under the Article XX Chapeau, a given measure may not have an
"arbitrary or unjustifiable" discriminatory effect. The Appellate
Body discussed this requirement most thoroughly in the U.S. -
Shrimp case.' In that case, the SAB held that the "single, rigid and
41. Id. para. 156.
42. Id. para. 159; see also id. para. 120 ("The standards established in the
Chapeau are necessarily broad in scope and reach .... When applied in a
particular case, the actual contours and contents of these standards will vary as the
kind of measure under examination varies.").
43. See EC - Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 25, para. 168 ("[lit
is undisputed that WTO Members have the right to determine the level of
protection of health that they consider appropriate in a given situation.").
44. See generally, U.S. - Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 34, paras.
161-86 (articulating the meaning of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination). A
showing of such discrimination requires that the application of the measure in
question in fact results in discrimination, and that the discrimination occurs
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unbending requirement" that other countries adopt the program of
the importing country that has imposed a measure, "without
inquiring into the appropriateness of that program for the conditions
prevailing in the exporting countries," constitutes arbitrary
discrimination." Arbitrary discrimination also results from the denial
of basic fairness and due process rights, such as transparency, the
right to be heard, the right to notice of denial, and the right of appeal
therefrom.46
In U.S. - Shrimp, the SAB found unjustifiable discrimination
based on the intended and actual coercive effect of the measure at
issue on the specific policy decisions made by other WTO
Members. 7 The effect of that measure's application was "to establish
a rigid and unbending standard" that ignored other specific policies
and measures that an exporting country had adopted to accomplish
the same policy objective. The SAB held that it was unacceptable
"for one WTO Member to use an economic embargo to require other
Members to adopt essentially the same comprehensive regulatory
program, to achieve a certain policy goal, as that in force within that
Member's territory, without taking into consideration different
conditions which may occur in the territories of those other
Members."49
Another unjustifiable aspect of the regulatory program at issue in
U.S. - Shrimp was the failure of the United States to engage certain
exporting Members "in serious, across-the-board negotiations with
the objective of concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements...
before enforcing the import prohibition.""' In this regard, the SAB
between countries where the same conditions prevail. See id.
45. Id. para. 177.
46. See id. para. 183 (acknowledging unjustifiable or arbitrary discrimination
results when certain minimum standards for procedural fairness, established in
Article X:3 of the GATT 1994, are not met).
47. See id. para. 161 (indicating that the most conspicuous flaw in application
of the U.S. measure relates to its "intended and actual coercive effect on the
specific policy decisions" that WTO Members made).
48. See id. para. 163 (stating that the actual application of the U.S. measure
required other WTO Members to adopt a regulatory program that was essentially
the same as that applied to U.S. shrimp vessels).
49. Id. para. 164 (emphasis added).
50. U.S. - Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 34, para. 166.
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held that the Inter-American Convention on Sea Turtles"' provided
"convincing demonstration that an alternative course of action was
reasonably open... for securing the legitimate policy goal of [the]
measure, a course of action other than the unilateral and non-
consensual procedures of the import prohibition.""2
The SAB in U.S. - Shlimp also cited other kinds of differential
treatment of various exporting countries. While the United States
accorded some countries a three-year phase-in period to comply with
the measure in question, others had only four months. 3 While the
differing phase-in periods resulted from U.S. court decisions, that
fact did not relieve the United States of responsibility, since all WTO
Members assume responsibility for acts of all their departments,
including the judiciary." In addition, the United States made varying
efforts vis-A-vis third countries to transfer the technology necessary
to comply with the measure at issue.5
51. Inter-American Convention on Sea Turtles, Dec. 1, 1996, S. TREATY Doc.
No. 105-48 (1998). This Convention involved the United States and other WTO
Members from the Caribbean/Western Atlantic region.
52. Id. para. 171; see, e.g., id. para. 170 (explaining that the parties to the Inter-
American Convention on Sea Turtles demonstrated the conviction of the
Convention's signatories that "consensual and multilateral procedures are available
and feasible for the establishment of programs for the conservation of sea turtles").
53. See id. para. 172 (noting that the fourteen countries in the wider
Caribbean/Western Atlantic region had a "'phase-in" period of three years to adjust
to the requirement regarding the use of the Turtle Excluder Devices ("TEDs"),
while India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand (the appellees) had only four months
to implement the use of TEDs). The length of the "phase-in" period is important
for exporting countries that desire certification; that period relates directly to how
onerous the burdens of complying with the requisites of certification are, as well as
the practical feasibility of locating and developing alternative export markets for
shrimp. See id. para. 174. The shorter the period, the heavier the burdens of
compliance and the greater the difficulties of re-orientating the shrimp exports,
particularly where a large number of vessels are involved. See id.
54. See U.S. - Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 34, para. 173
(acknowledging that the United States Court of International Trade directed the
implementation of greatly differing "phase-in" periods)..
55. See id. par. 175 (identifying that the United States made far greater effort
to transfer TED technology successfully to the fourteen countries than to the
appellees' home countries). In effect, "[b]ecause compliance with the requirements
of certification realistically assumes successful TED technology transfer, low or
merely nominal efforts at achieving that transfer will, in all probability, result in
fewer countries being able to satisfy the certification requirements ... within the
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c. No Disguised Restriction of Trade
As the WTO Panel observed in EC- Asbestos,56 "the actual scope
of the words 'disguised restriction on international trade' has not
been clearly defined. '57 Nonetheless, the Panel did cite the SAB
ruling in the U.S. - Gasoline58 case, which clarifies this phrase
somewhat:
"[D]isguised restriction", whatever else it covers, may properly be read as
embracing restrictions amounting to arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination in international trade taken under the guise of a measure
formally within the terms of an exception listed in Article XX. Put in a
somewhat different manner, the kinds of considerations pertinent in
deciding whether the application of a particular measure amounts to
"arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination", may also be taken into account
in determining the presence of a "disguised restriction" on international
trade. The fundamental theme is to be found in the purpose and object of
avoiding abuse or illegitimate use of the exceptions to substantive rules
available in Article XX. 59
Emphasizing the disguised nature of the restriction that the Article
XX Chapeau targets, the Panel in EC-Asbestos opined that an abuse
would be present if compliance with the requirements of one of the
exceptions listed in Article XX was "only a disguise to conceal the
pursuit of trade-restrictive objectives. '60 The Panel then applied the
approach that the SAB uses in relation to Article 111:2 of the GATT
1994,61 where the question of whether a measure has been applied for
very limited 'phase-in' periods ..... Id.
56. WTO Panel Report, European Communities - Measures Affecting
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000)
[hereinafter EC - Asbestos Panel Report].
57. Id. para. 8.233.
58. U.S. - Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 35.
59. EC - Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 56, para. 8.235 (drawing support
from the US - Gasoline Appellate Body Report); see generally U.S. - Gasoline
Appellate Body Report, supra note 35, para. 25.
60. EC - Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 56, para. 8.236.
61. See generalli WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages, WT/DS8; DSIO; DSII/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996) [hereinafler Japan -
Alcoholic Beverages Appellate Body Report] (employing a variety of factors to the
analysis of whether taxing two similar products differently violated Article 111:2 of
the GATT 1994).
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protective purposes may also arise, and examined the design,
architecture, and revealing structure of the measure at issue.6 -
Ultimately, the Panel in EC - Asbestos found no disguised pursuit
of trade-restrictive objectives on the grounds that:
1) the measure was a response of the government to health scares and
"panicked public opinion," which did not constitute a premeditated
intention to protect industry of an EC Member State, and
2) the information made available to the Panel did not suggest that the
measure benefited the domestic substitute product manufacturers, "'to the
detriment of third country producers, to such an extent as to lead to the
conclusion that [the measure] has been so applied as to constitute a
disguised restriction on international trade.
"' 63
In U.S. - Shrimp, both the original Panel and the Panel examining
the claim under Article 21.5 of the GATT 1994 followed the same
line of reasoning as the Panel in EC - Asbestos.6 Each panel found
that the measure at issue was not applied so as to constitute a
disguised restriction on trade .6 The panels based their findings on
the following elements:
1) environmental groups initiated the proceedings that resulted in the U.S.
court judgment which extended the scope of application of the measure at
issue to the appellant Member;
62. See EC - Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 56, para. 8.236 (explaining
that although a measure's true objective is not easily ascertainable, the design,
architecture, and structure of a measure can indicate whether the measure is a
disguised trade restriction).
63. Id. paras. 8.238-39. The Panel also noted that the effect of favoring the
domestic substitute product manufacturers "'is a natural consequence of prohibiting
a given product and in itself cannot justify the conclusion that the measure has a
protectionist aim, as long as it remains within certain limits." Id. While one could
question whether the prohibition of a given product would naturally favor domestic
substitute product manufacturers in particular, it is not at all clear what the "certain
limits" are to which the Panel is referring. See id.
64. See US - Shrimp Panel Report: Article 21.5, supra note 24, paras. 5.143-44
(noting that in the absence of a premeditated intention to protect the domestic
industry, mere showing of a protective measure would not prove the existence of
"disguised restriction on international trade").
65. See id. para. 5.144 (concluding that requiring other Member countries to
adopt TED technology did not constitute a "disguised restriction" on international
trade).
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2) U.S. producers were subject to comparable constraints; and,
3) U.S. producers were likely to obtain little commercial gain from the
measure at issue given the flexibility of the measure and the acceptance of
comparable programs for compliance purposes.
66
Although various aspects of the panels' reasoning in these cases
are debatable, there was no appeal of the findings in either case, and
thus the SAB did not address the analysis. What appears clear,
however, is that to the extent a "disguised restriction on international
trade" includes something more than "arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination," a determination of its existence requires an
examination of all the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the
measure at issue. In this regard, the various factors that the SAB has
cited in relation to Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement would all
appear to be relevant: the extent of the discrepancy in levels of
protection; the absence of risk assessment on which to base a
protective measure; various proposals relating to adoption of a
measure; and the absence of strict internal control over the product at
issue.67
Given the uncertain contours of the term "disguised restriction on
international trade," and the fact that the term stands on its own in
the Chapeau to Article XX, the question arises as to its objective
limits. Unlike Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement, the Chapeau of
Article XX does not first require a finding of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination before determining whether there is a
disguised restriction on international trade. In the absence of some
kind of discrimination in favor of domestic producers of the same
product or a close substitute, it would appear that damage would in
practice be minimal. For this reason, the use of the analysis
developed under Article 111:2 of the GATT 1994 is particularly apt.6"
66. Id. para. 5.143.
67. See infra Part II.C.2.f. (discussing factors that must be present to show
arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in levels of protection that a Member
considers appropriate in certain situations).
68. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (examining the design,
architecture, and structure of a measure to determine whether a measure is a
disguised restriction on trade).
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4. Deference to a Precautionari, Approach
In an evaluation of the extent to which Article XX of the GATT
1994 defers to a WTO Member's precautionary approach to HSE
risks, several pronouncements of the SAB stand out. First, and most
fundamentally, there is no dispute that WTO Members are free to
choose their own appropriate level of protection with regard to risks
to health and safety.69 This implies that there is no obstacle in
principle to the choice of a zero risk level of protection with regard
to a given risk.
Second, in order for a measure to meet the requirements of Article
XX, a basic relationship must exist between the measure and the
policy objective recognized under that Article.7" While health and
safety measures must be necessary to obtain their objective, which
implies that some scientific evidence supports the determination that
they are necessary, the SAB also recognizes that 1) the relevant risk
may be evaluated in qualitative, rather than quantitative terns,7' and
2) a Member is not obliged, in setting health policy, to automatically
follow what, at a given time, may constitute a majority scientific
opinion. 
2
Neither Article XX itself nor SAB interpretations of that provision
mention any possibility of the imposition of (provisional) measures
in the absence of sufficient scientific evidence. However, the fact
that compliance with the SPS Agreement creates a presumption of
compliance with other GATT provisions means that the imposition
and maintenance of provisional measures in accordance with Article
5.7 of the SPS Agreement would be deemed, at least prima facie, to
meet the requirements of Article XX of the GATT 1994.73 This
69. See EC - Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 25, para. 168
(emphasizing the right of each Member to establish a level of protection that is
appropriate for its own population).
70. See discussion supra Part II.B.2. (examining the relationship between a
measure and the policy objective it purports to fulfill).
71. See EC -Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 25, para. 167 (stating
that risk may be evaluated either in quantitative or qualitative terms).
72. See id. para. 178 (recognizing that a Member may rely in good faith on
scientific sources which represent "a divergent, but qualified and respected,
opinion").
73. See SPS Agreement, supra note 3, Art. 2.4 ("Sanitary or phytosanitary
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presumption in turn incorporates the deference shown to a
precautionary approach with regard to the obligations imposed by
Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement.74
Finally, although the SAB has not yet reviewed their analysis, the
panels in EC - Asbestos and U.S. - Shrimp arguably afforded
deference to a precautionary approach in determining whether the
measure at issue was a "disguised restriction on trade."75 In
particular, the EC- Asbestos panel highlighted the role of concurrent
health scares and "panicked public opinion," which together would
lead government authorities to act more quickly with less evidence-
i.e., with more precaution-than under other circumstances."6 In U.S.
- Shrimp, the Panel observed that the U.S. court judgment, which
extended the scope of application of the measure at issue to cover the
appellant Member, resulted from a procedure that environmental
groups initiated.77 The Panel appeared to believe that such groups
were not motivated by trade considerations. In any event, those
groups would presumably favor a more, rather than a less,
precautionary approach.
measures which conform to the relevant provisions of this agreement shall be
presumed to be in accordance with the obligations of the Members under the
provisions of GATT 1994 which relate to the use of sanitary or phytosanitary
measures, in particular the provisions of Article XX(b)."); see also id., Art. 5.7
(stating that in cases where scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may adopt
provisional measures based on existing relevant information).
74. See infra Part II.C.2.d. (discussing Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement,
which creates an exemption from the obligation under Article 2.2 to adopt a
provisional measure based on scientific evidence).
75. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (explaining that the panels
allowed for a precautionary approach in determining the existence of a disguised
restriction on trade).
76. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (implying that when a
government responded to health scares and panicked public opinion, the Panel was
not likely to find a "disguised restriction on the international trade" in the absence
of a premeditated intention to protect the domestic industry).
77. See WTO Panel Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R, para. 3.107 (May 15, 1998)
[hereinafter U.S. - Shrimp Panel Report].
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C. SPS AGREEMENT
1. Measures in Confoi-nitvl with Inter-national Standards
Under Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement, SPS measures are
deemed necessary to protect life or health, and presumed to be
consistent with the relevant provisions of the SPS Agreement and of
GATT 1994, if they conform with international standards,
guidelines, or recommendations." As the SAB noted in EC -
Hormones, this reflects an underlying objective of the SPS
Agreement: to consider international standards as a basis for future
harmonization. 9 While international standards may in effect be
protectionist (e.g., to the extent that their strictness precludes certain
countries from meeting the standards), their multilateral nature at
least precludes unilateral protectionism in their design.
2. Measures Necessay to Achieve a Higher Level of Protection
a. Unilateral Choice of the Level of Protection
Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement allows a Member to introduce
unilateral measures resulting in a higher level of protection than
would otherwise be achieved by measures based on relevant
international standards. This is true, however, only if those measures
are necessary to achieve the level of protection that the Member
deems appropriate, and not inconsistent with any other provision of
the SPS Agreement.8"
Through Article 3.3, the SPS Agreement clearly recognizes the
prerogative of the Member adopting the measure to determine its
appropriate level of protection.8' While Article 5.4 of the SPS
78. See SPS Agreement, supra note 3, Art 3.2.
79. See EC - Beef Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, para. 172
(stating that the SPS Agreement desires to promote the use of harmonized SPS
measures between Members on the basis of international standards, although
Member countries are free to adopt their own level of protection).
80. SPS Agreement, supra note 3, Art. 3.3
81. See, e.g., WTO Appellate Body Report, Australia - Measures Affecting
Importation of Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R, paras. 192 (Oct. 20, 1998) [hereinafter
Australia - Salmon Appellate Body Report] (stating that neither the Panel nor the
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Agreement requires a Member to "take into account the objective of
minimizing negative trade effects" when determining the appropriate
level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection,82 there is, in principle,
no obstacle to the choice of zero risk as the appropriate level of
protection.83
While the determination of the appropriate level of protection is a
prerogative of the importing Member, the SAB also considers it an
implied obligation under the SPS Agreement.84 This position justifies
using the level of protection that results from the SPS measure as the
one deemed to be appropriate in cases where the importing Member
has not clearly articulated that level of protection. 5
b. Necessary to Achieve the Chosen Level of Protection
Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement allows a Member to adopt a
unilateral measure that is necessary to achieve the level of protection
the Member deems appropriate.86 While no panel or Appellate Body
report has thus far had occasion to interpret the concept of
"necessity" contained in this provision, the wording of Article 3.3 is
nearly identical to that of Article XX(b), which deals with measures
that are "necessary" to protect public health.87 In EC - Asbestos, the
SAB affirmed that the concept of "necessity" under Article XX(b)
involves a determination of whether an alternative measure exists
Appellate Body can substitute its reasoning regarding the appropriate protection
level for that consistently expressed by Australia).
82. SPS Agreement, supra note 3, Art. 5.4.
83. See Australia - Salmon Appellate Body Report, supra note 81, para. 122
(distinguishing between the evaluation of risk in a risk assessment and the
determination of the appropriate protection level).
84. See id. paras. 198-199 (finding the obligation implicit in paragraph three of
Annex B, as well as Article 4.1161, Article 5.4, and Article 5.6 of the SPS
Agreement).
85. See id. para. 200 (indicating that a Member's failure to determine the
appropriate level of protection would otherwise allow it to escape its obligations
under the SPS Agreement-specifically those articulated in Articles 5.5 and 5.6).
86. See SPS Agreement, supra note 3, Art. 3.3.
87. Compare SPS Agreement, supra note 3, Art. 3.3, wiith GATT 1994, supra
note 1, Art. XX (b) (discussing the concept of "necessity" in each agreement).
928 [ 17:905
PRECA UTIONAR Y PRINCIPLE
that is reasonably available to achieve the targeted level of protection
and that is less inconsistent with WTO rules."
Because Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement obligates a Member,
when establishing or maintaining an SPS measure, to ensure that the
measure is not more trade-restrictive than necessary to achieve the
chosen appropriate level of protection," an apparent overlap exists
between Articles 3.3 and 5.6. The footnote to Article 5.6 alludes to
this overlap by indicating that a measure is more trade-restrictive
than required if another SPS measure is both reasonably available to
achieve the Member's appropriate level of protection
and significantly less restrictive to trade than the SPS measure in
question.90
c. Generally Based on Sufficient Scientific Evidence
Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement requires that Members adopt
SPS measures on the basis of a risk assessment." As interpreted by
the Appellate Body in EC - Hormones, this provision, when read in
the light of Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement, "requires that the
results of the risk assessment must sufficiently warrant-that is to
say, reasonably support-the SPS measure at stake. 9"  This is
consistent with 1) Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement, which stipulates
that Members "shall ensure that any SPS measure ... is not
maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, except as provided
for in paragraph 7 of Article 5,'93 and 2) Article 3.3 of the SPS
Agreement, which allows Members to adopt a unilateral SPS
88. See EC - Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 25, paras. 170-75;
see also hifira Part II.B.2. (listing factors to consider when determining whether an
alternative measure is reasonably available). The Appellate Body has also affirmed
the use of this standard in addressing the issue of-necessity" under Article XX(d).
See Korea - Beef Appellate Body Report, supra note 31, paras. 165-66 (employing
a "weighing and balancing process" to determine whether an alternative measure
exists).
89. See SPS Agreement, supra note 3, Art. 5.6 (specifying that the restriction
must consider technical and economic feasibility); see also hdi'a notes 111-113
and accompanying text (discussing the scope of Article 5.6).
90. See SPS Agreement, supra note 3, Art. 5.6, n.3.
91. Seeid. Art. 5.1.
92. EC - Beef Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, para. 193.
93. SPS Agreement, supra note 3, Art. 2.2.
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measure "if there is a scientific justification" and the measure is not
inconsistent with any other provision of the SPS Agreement. 4
The "scientific justification" requirement in Article 3.3 is met "if
there is a rational relationship between the SPS measure at issue and
the available scientific information. 95 Similarly, the obligation in
Article 2.2 "requires that there be a rational or objective relationship
between the SPS measure and the scientific evidence."96 Whether
such a relationship exists is "determined on a case-by-case basis and
will depend upon the particular circumstances of the case, including
the characteristics of the measure at issue and the quality and
quantity of the scientific evidence."97
The Article 5.1 requirement of a risk assessment is "a specific
application of the basic obligations contained in Article 2.2."' For a
risk assessment to be valid,99 the "risk" evaluated must be an
94. Id. Art. 3.3.
95. WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan - Measures Affecting Agricultural
Products, WT/DS76/AB/R, para. 79 (Feb. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Japan
Agricultural Products Appellate Body Report].
96. Id. para. 76; see also SPS Agreement, supra note 3, Art. 2.2 (requiring
Members to ensure that their measures do not discriminate, are based on scientific
principles, and are supported by scientific evidence).
97. Japan -Agricultural Products Appellate Body Report, supra note 95, para.
84.
98. Id. para. 82.
99. These comments regarding risk assessments apply to both types of risk
assessment described in paragraph four of Annex A to the SPS Agreement: an
evaluation of the likelihood of entry or spread of a disease within an importing
Member country and associated biological or economic consequences; and an
evaluation of potential adverse health effects arising from additives or toxins
contained in food, beverages, and feedstuffs. See SPS Agreement, supra note 3,
Annex A. While Australia - Salmon involved the first type of risk assessment, EC
- Beef Hormones involved a situation requiring a risk assessment of the second
type. See generally Australia - Salmon Appellate Body Report, supra note 81; EC
- Beef Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 16. The primary difference
between the two types of risk assessments is that the first "demands an evaluation
of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a disease, and of the
associated potential biological and economic consequences," while the second
"requires only the evaluation of the potential lbr adverse effects on human or
animal health." Australia - Salmon Appellate Body Report, supra note 81, para.
123 n.69.
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ascertainable risk.' ° There is, however, no requirement for a risk
assessment to establish a certain magnitude or threshold level of
degree of risk.' 10 Furthermore, it is not necessary that the risk
assessment "embody only the view of a majority of the relevant
scientific community ... [R]esponsible and representative
governments may act in good faith on the basis of what, at a given
time, may be a divergent opinion coming from qualified and
respected sources."'02 Additionally, the SPS measure at issue "may
be objectively justified in a risk assessment carried out by another
Member or an international organization."' 3
The fact that Article 5.1 is a specific application of the Article 2.2
obligation implies that if an SPS measure is not based on the risk
assessment required by Article 5.1, the measure "can be presumed,
more generally, not to be based on scientific principles or to be
maintained without sufficient scientific evidence.""'
d. Exceptionally Based Only on Available Information
Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement allows Members to adopt a
provisional SPS measure on the basis of "available pertinent
information" when "relevant scientific evidence is insufficient."'0 5 In
such a circumstance, Article 5.7 requires the Member in question to
"seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more
objective assessment of risk and review the SPS measure accordingly
within a reasonable period of time.""
100. EC - Beef Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, para. 186;
Australia - Salmon Appellate Body Report, supra note 81, para. 122.
101. EC - Beef Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, para. 186;
Australia - Salmon Appellate Body Report, supra note 81, para. 121.
102. EC - Beef Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, para. 194; see
also Japan - Agricultural Products Appellate Body Report, supra note 95, para. 77
(citing the EC - Beef Hormones Appellate Body Report).
103. EC- Beef Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, para. 190.
104. Australia - Salmon Appellate Body Report, supra note 81, paras. 134-135
(holding that Australia violated Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement because its
import prohibition was not based on a risk assessment as required by Article 5.1).
105. SPS Agreement, supra note 3, Art. 5.7.
106. Id.
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As stated by the SAB, "Article 5.7 operates as a qualified
exemption from the obligation under Article 2.2 not to maintain SPS
measures without sufficient scientific evidence."" 7 In other words, a
Member may adopt a measure without sufficient scientific evidence,
but the measure must be adopted on the basis of "available pertinent
information," the measure must be "provisional" (limited in time),
the Member must seek "to obtain the additional information
necessary for a more objective assessment of risk," and the Member
must review the measure "within a reasonable period of time."""
The obligation to seek to obtain additional information does not
require specific results. It merely requires that the Member in
question seek to obtain information that is "germane" to a proper risk
assessment.109
107. Japan - Agricultural Products Appellate Body Report, supra note 95, para.
80.
108. In Japan - Agricultural Products Appellate Body Report, supra note 95,
para. 89, the SAB also set out four cumulative requirements under Article 5.7, but
not the same four as those cited here. In particular, the SAB did not highlight the
fact that the measure in question must be provisional. On the one hand, the
requirement that a Member review a measure within a reasonable period of time
could be said to imply that the measure must be provisional. On the other hand,
nothing prevents a definitive measure from including a review mechanism. In this
author's opinion, it is therefore useful to highlight separately the Article 5.7
requirement that the measure be provisional.
The SAB brought out an additional requirement under Article 5.7, that a measure
must be "imposed in respect of a situation where 'relevant scientific information is
insufficient."' Such a requirement would be superfluous unless it meant that a
Member could only adopt a provisional measure under Article 5.7 if the available
information did not permit a scientific conclusion one way or the other. This
follows from the fact that if the scientific evidence gave sufficient support to the
measure, the measure would be justified under Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement
and there would be no need for a member to invoke Article 5.7. In other words, the
measure in question would not be justified under Article 5.7 if relevant scientific
information showed to a sufficient degree either that the measure in question was
necessary (in which case it would be justified under Article 3.3) or that it was
unnecessary. Because of the deferential manner in which the evaluation of the risk
assessment is to be conducted, however, it would appear that scientific information
that purported to show conclusively that the measure in question was not necessary
would receive a correspondingly low degree of deference (i.e., a high degree of
scrutiny). See supra Part II.C.2. In other words, it is most unlikely that this
additional requirement of scientific uncertainty would impose any real practical
burden.
109. See Japan - Agricultural Products Appellate Body Report, supra note 95,
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With regard to the review requirement, "what constitutes a
'reasonable period of time' has to be established on a case-by-case
basis and depends on the specific circumstances of each case,
including the difficulty of obtaining the additional information
necessary for the review and the characteristics of the provisional
SPS measure."' " 0
e. Not More Trade-Restrictive Than Necessary
Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement requires that the SPS measure at
issue not be more restrictive of international trade than necessary."'
To this effect, the footnote to Article 5.6 enumerates three elements
that, taken together," 2 indicate that a measure is more trade-
restrictive than required: 1) another SPS measure is reasonably
available, taking into account technical and economic feasibility; 2)
that other measure achieves the Member's appropriate level of
protection; and, 3) that other measure is significantly less restrictive
to trade than the SPS measure contested." 
3
f. Not a Disguised Restriction of Trade
Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement prohibits "arbitrary or
unjustifiable distinctions in the levels [of protection a Member]
considers to be appropriate in different situations, if such distinctions
result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on international
trade.""' 4 A showing under this provision involves three cumulative
elements: 1) the Member concerned has varied the levels of
protection in different situations; 2) those distinctions are arbitrary or
unjustifiable; and, 3) those distinctions result in discrimination or a
disguised restriction on international trade.' '5
para. 92 (citing as an example of appropriate additional information an evaluation
of the likelihood of entry).
110. Id. para. 93.
111. See SPS Agreement, supra note 3, Art. 5.6.
112. See Japan - Agricultural Products Appellate Body Report, supra note 95,
para. 95 (specifying that these elements are cumulative).
113. SPS Agreement, supra note 3, Art. 5.6 n.3.
114. Id. Art. 5.5.
115. EC - Beef Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, paras. 212-15.
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With regard to the first element, it is necessary that the situations
being compared are in fact comparable, that "they present some
common element or elements sufficient to render them
comparable.""' 6 As observed by the Appellate Body in Australia -
Salmon, it is not necessary that the two situations under comparison
share all elements in common."17 For example, situations can be
compared under Article 5.5 if they involve either a risk of entry of
the same or similar disease, or a risk of the same or similar
associated potential biological and economic consequences."' Also,
for situations to be comparable under Article 5.5, it is sufficient for
them to have in common a risk of entry of one disease of concern. It
is not necessary for them to have in common a risk of entry of all
diseases of concern.'119
Regarding the second element, distinct levels of protection may be
arbitrary or unjustifiable if, for example, the risks that the more
lenient measures address are actually greater than those the
challenged measure addresses. 2 '
Finally, a finding that arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in
levels of protection result in a disguised restriction on trade involves
consideration of several factors, including the degree of difference,
or the extent of the discrepancy, in the levels of protection;' 2' the
absence of a sufficient risk assessment that serves as the basis for the
SPS measure that is challenged;'22 proposals made in the course of
116. Id. para. 217. Situations involving the same substance or the same adverse
health effect are comparable. See id.
117. See Australia - Salmon Appellate Body Report, supra note 81, para. 146
(specifying that the disease, the biological consequences, and the economic
consequences do not need to be the same or similar).
118. See id.
119. See id. paras. 143 and 148.
120. See id. para. 149 (upholding the Panel's finding that a distinction between
Pacific salmon and herring was arbitrary or unjustifiable).
121. See EC - Beef Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, para. 240
(stating that the difference in the levels of protection, when combined with other
factors, can be sufficient to determine that those levels constitute a disguised
restriction on trade).
122. See Australia - Salmon Appellate Body Report, supra note 81, para 159
(noting that absence of a risk assessment, or an insufficient risk assessment, is a
strong indication that the measure in question is a disguised restriction on trade).
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adopting the SPS measure in question; 23 and, the absence of
similarly strict internal (domestic) controls regarding the product at
issue. 4
g. Not Arbitrary or Unjustifiable Discrimination
Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement provides that a Member's SPS
measures must not "arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between
Members where identical or similar conditions prevail, including
between their own territory and that of other Members."' 25 This
condition includes, and goes beyond, the provisions of Article 5.5 of
the SPS Agreement, which prohibits an arbitrary or unjustifiable
distinction in levels of protection only if it results in a disguised
restriction on trade. 126 In other words, a finding of a violation of
Article 5.5 will necessarily imply a violation of Article 2.3. By
contrast, a finding of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination under
Article 2.3 is possible without an examination of Article 5.5.127
In addition, because the language of Article 2.3 of the SPS
Agreement repeats part of the conditions of the Chapeau of Article
XX, the interpretation of the same conditions in the Chapeau of
Article XX should also apply to Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement.'
2
1
3. Deference to a Member's Precautionai-' Approach
In EC - Beef Hormones, the SAB affirmed that "the precautionary
principle has not been written into the SPS Agreement as a ground
for justifying SPS measures that are otherwise inconsistent with the
obligations of Members set out in particular provisions of that
123. See id. para. 165 (agreeing with the Panel decision that draft proposals are
appropriate criteria for determining whether a measure under consideration
disguises a restriction on trade).
124. See id. para. 168 (using the difference between different SPS measures as
an indicator of a disguised restriction on trade).
125. SPS Agreement, supra note 3, Art. 2.3.
126. See id. Art. 5.5.
127. See Australia - Salmon Appellate Body Report, supra note 81, para. 244
(stating that an Article 5.5 violation automatically implies an Article 2.3 violation,
but an Article 2.3 violation does not necessarily constitute an Article 5.5 violation).
128. See discussion supra Part ll.B.3.b (detailing the no "'arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination" requirement of the Chapeau of Article XX).
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Agreement."'' 29 At the same time, from this discussion of the various
provisions of the SPS Agreement, and the SAB's interpretation of'
those provisions, it is evident that the SPS Agreement affords
deference to a precautionary approach taken by WTO Members in
several essential respects.
First, as a fundamental principle, WTO Members are free to
choose their own appropriate level of protection with regard to risks
to health and safety. 3 ' Thus, nothing hinders the choice of a zero risk
level of protection with regard to a given risk. In other words, in
deciding the extent to which its population shall be exposed to a
given risk, a Member may act with maximum precaution in setting
the acceptable level of exposure.' 3
Second, a risk assessment, which is the basis for the Member's
SPS measure, does not need to "embody only the view of a majority
of the relevant scientific community" in order to meet the
requirements of Article 5 of the SPS agreement.'32 This flexibility in
the risk assessment standard supports a precautionary approach to the
extent that it allows a WTO Member to follow a minority view
concerning the existence and/or magnitude of a given risk.
Specifically, the standard allows a Member to follow a scientific
view that supports a more restrictive measure in a situation of
legitimate uncertainty.
Third, when determining whether an SPS measure is sufficiently
based on a risk assessment, a panel should bear in mind that
"responsible, representative governments commonly act from
perspectives of prudence and precaution where risks of irreversible,
129. EC - Beef Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, para. 124.
130. See Australia - Salmon Appellate Body Report, supra note 81, para. 192.
Regarding the EC, see, e.g., European Commission, Communication fioin the
Commission on the Precautionary Principle, COM(2000)l final, at 10 [hereinafter
Precautionary Communication] (indicating that each WTO Member may
determine its own level of protection).
131. See Australia - Salmon Appellate Body Report, supra note 81, para. 122.
Regarding the EC, see, e.g., Precautionarv Communication at 10 (asserting that a
Member may apply measures associated with a higher level of protection than
relevant international standards recommend).
132. See EC - Beef Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, para. 194.
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e.g. life-terminating, damage to human health are concerned."'133
Thus, when determining whether there is a rational or objective
relationship between the SPS measure and the scientific evidence, a
WTO panel must consider the fact that it is rational and predictable
that a Member, faced with risks of serious and irreversible harm,
would adopt a precautionary approach.
Finally, even in the absence of a sufficient risk assessment, a
Member may, under Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement, adopt a
provisional SPS measure on the basis of relevant available
information. 34 This provision recognizes that a WTO Member may
at times feel constrained to adopt a measure for whatever reason-
including a perceived need to apply a precautionary approach-
without a sufficient, objective basis. " ' The fact, however, that
Article 5.7 requires the Member to seek to obtain the relevant
evidence within a reasonable period of time appears to temper this
deference to a precautionary approach.1
36
On the other hand, even the obligations set out in Article 5.7 with
regard to such a provisional measure are interpreted in a manner that
provides ample room for a precautionary approach. For example, the
obligation to seek to obtain additional information does not require
specific results. It merely requires that the Member in question seek
to obtain information that is germane to the conduct of a proper risk
assessment.'37 Additionally, there is an obligation to review the
measure within a reasonable period, but what constitutes a
"reasonable period of time" is established on a case-by-case basis.' 31
133. See id.
134. See SPS Agreement, supra note 3, Art. 5.7 (stating that a Member may
provisionally adopt an SPS measure in cases where there is insufficient relevant
scientific evidence).
135. See id. (allowing a Member to adopt a provisional SPS measure without
specifying the reason for the absence of relevant scientific evidence).
136. See id. (requiring a Member that has adopted a provisional measure to try
to obtain the relevant evidence within a reasonable amount of time).
137. See Japan - Agricultural Products Appellate Body Report, supra note 107,
para. 92 (indicating that a Member need only try to obtain information relevant to a
more objective risk assessment).
138. See id., para. 93, and, regarding the EC, Precautionary Comnnnication,
supra note 130, at 27 (declaring that the definition of a "'reasonable period of time"
is decided on a case-by-case basis).
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This determination will depend on several factors, such as the
difficulty of obtaining the additional information necessary for the
review, and the characteristics of the provisional SPS measure."
D. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING ARTICLE XX AND THE SPS
AGREEMENT
Overall, both Article XX of the GATT 1994 and several
provisions of the SPS Agreement show, in several important
respects, deference to a precautionary approach taken by WTO
Members in the adoption of HSE measures. 40 In particular, while
scientific evidence must in principle support a given measure, each
Member has wide latitude to chose its own "appropriate" level of
protection. 4' Furthermore, it is not necessary that the scientific
support for the measure represents a majority position,'42 and an
evaluation of the adequacy of the relationship between the scientific
risk assessment and the measure at issue should take into account the
fact that representative governments act in a precautionary manner. 1
Together, these points make it likely that a Member's measure
would have an adequate basis if the Member has made any
substantial effort to carry out a proper risk assessment. 44 In this
regard, a developing country which lacks the resources needed to
139. See Japan - Agricultural Products Appellate Body Report, supra note 107,
para. 93. See also, regarding the EC, Precautionary Communication, supra note
130, at 27 (discussing the reasonable period set forth in the SPS agreement and
factors used to consider whether it has been satisfied).
140. Compare discussion supra Part II.B.4. (detailing the deference afforded a
precautionary approach by Article XX of the GATT), with discussion supra Part
II.C.3. (describing the SPS Agreement's deference to the precautionary approach).
141. See supra notes 69 and 132-34 and accompanying text (stating the
fundamental principle that each WTO Member is free to choose its level of
protection).
142. See supra notes 72 and 132-33 and accompanying text (indicating that the
scientific support for an HSE measure does not have to represent a majority
position).
143. See supra notes 120-21 (discussing a representative government's
propensity to act in a prudent and precautionary manner).
144. See supra notes 140-143 and accompanying text (describing the features of'
Article XX of the GATT 1994 and the SPS Agreement, which demonstrate
deference to the precautionary principle).
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carry out a proper risk assessment may adopt a measure on the basis
of a risk assessment carried out by another Member or by an
international organization. Further, even in the absence of a proper
risk assessment, a Member may adopt provisional measures.'
From a trade perspective, the strongest restraints on the use of
HSE measures are that a given measure must be the least trade-
restrictive among reasonably available measures that accomplish the
same level of protection, 4 6 and that measure must not result in
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against another WTO
Member. 47 This resultis entirely appropriate because even a
perceived need for a precautionary approach should not lead a
Member to choose disproportionately restrictive measures-more
restrictive than other measures that would accomplish the same level
of protection-or measures which discriminate in an arbitrary or
unjustifiable manner. That said, the SAB has even afforded a large
degree of deference to national HSE measures through its restrictive
interpretation of when an alternative measure is "reasonably
available" and would accomplish "the same level of protection,"'48 as
well as its liberal construction of requirements regarding due process
and efforts to negotiate international agreements."'
145. See SPS Agreement, supra note 3, Art. 5.7 (setting forth the standards for
implementing a provisional SPS measure).
146. See discussion supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (describing the
SAB's interpretation of the necessity requirement of Article XX of the GATT as
including a no less restrictive measure requirement); SPS Agreement, supra note 3,
Art. 5.6 (indicating that Members' SPS measures shall not be more restrictive than
necessary).
147. See discussion supra Part ll.B.3.b. (detailing the prohibition on arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination in Article XX of the GATT); see also discussion supra
Part II.C.2.g. (describing the prohibition on arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination in Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement).
148. See, e.g., EC - Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 25, paras. 169-
75 (listing the factors to consider when determining whether a particular measure
is necessary or reasonably available).
149. See, e.g., WTO Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Prohibition
of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia,
WT/DS58/AB/RW, [hereinafter U.S. - Shrimp Appellate Body Report: Article
21.5], paras. 122-34 (describing the good faith efforts required to avoid an
arbitrary or unjustified discrimination determination).
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III.RESULTS OF THE DOHA MINISTERIAL
A. INTRODUCTION
More than a year before the Doha Ministerial, negotiations began
to address a series of concerns that developing countries raised
concerning the implementation of agreements reached at the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round. 5 ' Some of these concerns related
to the implementation of the SPS Agreement and the manner in
which developed countries took precautionary measures against
imports from developing countries. 5' Meanwhile, developed
countries were reluctant to recognize exporting countries' measures
to protect health and safety, resulting in unequal treatment of the
developing countries' products.'52 This state of affairs magnified the
extent to which the measures that importing countries took restricted
trade.'53 These concerns were so important that addressing them was
a precondition for developing countries to participate in a new round
of substantive WTO negotiations.'
Concurrently, and even prior to the 1999 Seattle Ministerial, the
European Community in particular had openly set out among its
objectives for the new round of WTO negotiations, "[a] clarification
150. See WTO Documents, Briefing Note on WTO Agreements and Developing
Countries - Problems With Implementation [hereinafter Problems with
Inplementation] (discussing concerns developing countries raised about the
implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements, especially the costs these
countries incurred in attempting to implement the agreements).
151. See id. (noting criticism from developing countries that market access to
their exports in agriculture and textiles is inadequate, and that these countries do
not possess enough flexibility in terms of implementing SPS measures).
152. See WTO Documents, Briefing Note on Sanitary and Phytosanitarv (SPS)
Measures - Food Safety, etc., [hereinafter Food Safety] (detailing the concerns of
developing countries over the manner in which the SPS agreement has been
implemented), at http://www.wto.org/englishithewto e/minist e/min99 e/english/
aboute/08sps.e.htm (last visited March, 22, 2002).
153. See Problems with Inplenentation, supra note 150 (claiming that
developed countries have implemented the agreements in a way that fails to benefit
the developing countries' trade).
154. See id. (explaining that many developing countries believe they deserve




of the relationship between multilateral trade rules and core
environmental principles, notably the precautionary principle...
Such clarification should seek to secure, within the relevant WTO
rules, the importance of the precautionary principle, and to agree on
multilateral criteria for the scope of action possible under that
principle."'55 Additionally, the EC sought, "[t]o clarify and
strengthen the existing WTO framework for the use of the
precautionary principle in the area of food safety, in particular with a
view to finding an agreed methodology for the scope of action under
that principle."'1
5 6
While a clarification of rules is usually not controversial, the idea
of strengthening the framework for the use of "the precautionary
principle" drew opposition among WTO Members.'" Given the lack
of consensus on the definition of a "precautionary principle," and the
deference of the existing WTO rules to the precautionary HSE
measures that Members adopt, developing countries in particular had
reason to fear that further promotion of a precautionary approach
would translate into additional obstacles for exports to developed
countries. 58
155. European Commission, Connunication fiom the Commission to the
Council and the European Parliament on the EU Approach to the Millennium
Round, COM(99)331 final, at 15 [hereinafter EU Approach].
156. Id. at 18. In its Conclusions Regarding the Preparation of the Third VTO
Ministerial Conference, however, the Council was more vague than the
Commission when it stated: "[Oin the non-trade concerns [related to agriculture],
the Union will take forward the multifunctional role of agriculture, food safety,
including the precautionary principle, food quality, and animal welfare." European
Commission, Council Conclusions on the Preparation of the Third VTO
Ministerial Conference 4 (Oct. 25, 1999), at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/pdf/agrl5en.pdf. In terms of trade and the
environment, the Council stated that "a set of issues should be included in the
negotiations aiming.., at examining the role of core environmental principles,
notably the precautionary principle in WTO rules." Id. at 6.
157. See Food Safeoy, supra note 152 (discussing the debate surrounding the
strengthening of the precautionary principle).
158. See id. (delineating many of the developing countries' concerns over the
SPS Agreement).
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B. IMPLEMENTATION DECISION
The Doha Ministerial, in the Implementation Decision of
November 14, 2001, endorsed a number of initiatives aimed at
addressing deficiencies in the WTO framework for SPS measures
that have had the effect of limiting the rights of developing
countries. 5 9 These initiatives included financial and technical
assistance to least-developed countries to help them implement the
SPS Agreement, longer time-frames for developing countries to
comply with other countries' new SPS measures, a regular review of
the operation of the SPS Agreement at least once every four years,
and actions by the WTO Director-General to help developing
countries participate more effectively in setting international SPS
standards.
60
Included, and perhaps most important, among these initiatives is
the decision regarding "equivalence" guidelines.' 6' The basis for
these guidelines is Article 4 of the SPS Agreement, which states that:
Members shall accept the sanitary or phytosanitary measures of other
Members as equivalent, even if these measures differ from their own or
from those used by other Members trading in the same product, if the
exporting Member objectively demonstrates to the importing Member that
its measures achieve the importing Member's appropriate level of sanitary
or phytosanitary protection.162
While this provision sounds straightforward, many Members,
developing countries in particular, experienced difficulties in
persuading importing Members to recognize the equivalence of their
sanitary or phytosanitary measures.163 The practical consequence was
159. See Doha Implementation Decision, supra note 5, at I (stressing the
Conference's determination to address the concerns of the developing countries
over the implementation of some of the WTO Agreements and Decisions).
160. See id. para. 3. (setting forth the new initiatives relative to the SPS
Agreement).
161. See id. para. 3.3 (instructing the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures to develop a specific program to implement the equivalence guidelines).
162. SPS Agreement, supra note 3, Art. 4.
163. See supra notes 150-154 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties
developing countries experienced in the treatment of their exports).
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that the exporting Members found obtaining market access in the
importing countries to be problematic at times."
On October 24, 2001, the Committee on SPS Measures agreed on
an outline of steps designed to make it easier for all WTO Members
to make use of the equivalence provision.'65 Essentially, that decision
assigns a number of discrete tasks to importing and exporting
Members.
First, at the request of the exporting Member, the importing
Member should explain the objective and rationale of the SPS
measure and clearly identify the risks that the measure is intended to
address. The importing Member should also indicate the appropriate
level of protection which its measure is designed to achieve. The
explanation should be accompanied by a copy of the risk assessment
on which the measure is based, or a technical justification based on a
relevant international standard, guideline, or recommendation. The
importing Member should also provide any additional information
which may assist the exporting Member in demonstrating objectively
the equivalence of its own measure.'
66
Second, the exporting Member shall provide appropriate science-
based and technical information to support its objective
demonstration that its measure achieves the appropriate level of
protection identified by the importing Member. In addition, the
exporting Member shall provide reasonable access, upon request, to
the importing Member for inspection, testing and other relevant
procedures for the recognition of equivalence.' 67
Third, "an importing Member shall respond in a timely manner to
any request from an exporting Member for consideration of the
equivalence of its measures, normally within a six-month period of
time." 68 When considering the request, the importing Member
164. See generally Food Safeo, supra note 152 (describing the issues
surrounding the equivalence standards).
165. See WTO SPS Committee, Decision on the Inplementation of Article 4 of
the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitar' Measures,
G/SPS/19 (Oct. 26, 2001) [hereinafter Article 4 Decision].
166. See id. para. 2.
167. See id. para. 4.
168. Id. para. 3.
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should analyze the information provided by the exporting Member
with "a view to determining whether these measures achieve the
level of protection provided" by its own relevant SPS measures. 
6
1
Fourth, "the importing Member should accelerate its procedure for
determining equivalence in respect of those products which it has
historically imported from the exporting Member."'7 0
Finally, "a Member shall give full consideration to requests by
another Member, especially a developing country Member, for
appropriate technical assistance to facilitate the implementation of
Article 4 of the SPS Agreement." This includes helping to "identify
and implement measures which can be recognized as equivalent, or
to otherwise enhance market access opportunities."''
The Implementation Decision explicitly endorsed the decision of
October 24, 2001, and instructed the Committee on SPS Measures
"to develop expeditiously the specific programme to further the
implementation of Article 4" of the SPS Agreement. 7 2 To the extent
developing countries have felt that their measures were not
sufficiently recognized as equivalent, the steps endorsed in the
Implementation Decision give an important boost to the efforts of
those countries to gain increased access to export markets.
Specifically, with regard to the application by importing Members of'
a precautionary approach in adopting SPS measures, compliance
with the steps endorsed in the Implementation Decision should make
the precautionary element more transparent. This will come from the
importing Member's explanation of the scientific basis for its
measure, and from identification of the level of protection it
considers appropriate.
C. GENERAL DOHA DECLARATION
The very first item of the Work Programme in the General Doha
Declaration, reflecting the importance of the subject matter,
169. Id. para. 7.
170. Article 4 Decision, supra note 165, para. 5.
171. Id. para. 8.
172. Doha Implementation Decision, supra note 5, para. 3.3.
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addresses "implementation-related issues and concerns. ' 173 Among
other points, it specifically adopts the Implementation Decision and,
thus, the decision of the Committee on SPS Measures related to the
"equivalence" guidelines.'
In addition, new negotiations were launched under the heading of
"Trade and Environment," but the Programme did not specifically
adopt anything concerning the strengthening or even the application
of the precautionary principle.' The closest the Declaration comes
is with a general instruction to the Committee on Trade and
Environment, as part of its on-going work, to identify "any need to
clarify relevant WTO rules."' 7 6 The work of the Committee on Trade
and Environment will not, however, involve negotiations per se,
since the Committee may only make recommendations about the
desirability of negotiations on the points about which it received
instructions.'77
At the same time, the Ministers instructed the Committee on Trade
and Environment "to give particular attention to... the effect of
environmental measures on market access, especially in relation to
developing countries."' 18 The underlying concern-the recognition
that compliance with environmental requirements can be
burdensome for an exporter-is particularly relevant in connection
with measures adopted primarily on the basis of a precautionary
approach. For such measures, the compliance requirements are
clearly a burden, but by hypothesis it is not certain that a causal link
exists to the alleged hazards used to justify the measures.
The Doha Declaration contains no statement concerning new
negotiations about the rules relating to sanitary and phytosanitary
173. Doha Declaration, supra note 6, para. 12.
174. See id. (discussing implementation-related issues and concerns in the Work
Programme).
175. See id. paras. 31-33 (agreeing to the commencement of new negotiations on
several matters, none of which specifically address the precautionary principle).
176. Id. para. 32.
177. See id. (detailing the specific tasks charged to the Committee, none of
which include the actual negotiations).
178. Id.
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measures. 79 To the contrary, in the portion of the Work Programme
related to "Trade and Environment," the Declaration provides that
the outcome of the work of the Committee on Trade and
Environment, as well as the new negotiations regarding specific
MEA trade obligations and procedures for regular information
exchange, "shall not add to or diminish the rights and obligations of
members under existing WTO agreements, in particular the
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary or Phytosanitary
Measures, nor alter the balance of these rights and obligations, and
will take into account the needs of developing and least-developed
countries." 8 0
D. CONCLUSIONS
Any reference to clarification or strengthening of the
precautionary principle was conspicuously absent from the General
Doha Declaration. 8' In addition, the fact that the Declaration
specifically provides for the maintenance of existing rights and
obligations under the SPS Agreement ensures that the new round of
negotiations will not weaken a framework that is already highly
deferential to a precautionary approach to HSE measures.'82 In light
of the observations made above, this arrangement can be seen as a
restraint on the "race to the top" with regard to food safety standards
in developed countries-a race which effectively blocks exports
from developing countries.'83
The restraint in modifying the current rules, the decisions to
increase the capacities of developing countries, and the various
179. See generally id. (failing to address any new negotiations relating to SPS
measures).
180. Id. para. 32.
181. See supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text (discussing the absence of
consideration of the precautionary principle in the Doha Declaration).
182. See Doha Declaration, supra note 6, para. 32 (ensuring that existing rights
under the SPS Agreement are not altered).
183. Cf TSUNEHIRO OTSUKI, JOHN S. WILSON & MIRVAT SEWADEIl, A RACE TO
THE Top? A CASE STUDY OF FOOD SAFETY STANDARDS AND AFRICAN EXPORTS
(Development Research Group, World Bank, Working Paper No. 2563, 2000)
(quantifying the impact of particular food safety standards on food exports from
developing countries).
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guidelines to facilitate the access of developing countries' exports to
developed country markets are hopeful indications that developing
countries' concerns are being taken seriously as the new round
begins. Of course, much remains to be seen as to how the decisions
made at the Doha Ministerial are implemented in practice and
addressed in the remainder of the new round. At the same time, the
results of this Ministerial show the extent to which the developed
countries are unable simply to impose their will in the current
environment. The growing effectiveness of developing countries
arguably reflects, first, their recognition that they have much to gain
from the WTO Agreements and their active participation in the
system, and second, their increasing ability to find common ground
amongst themselves on key issues.
CONCLUSION
The European Community has been particularly active in pushing
for a greater endorsement of the precautionary principle in the WTO
Agreements.184 At the same time, it has recognized the need to meet
"developing country concerns over unilateralism and eco-
protectionism.., with a view to preventing potential abuses. '
While together these orientations could support a circumscribed set
of negotiations that might clarify the existing rules, the perspective
of the Main Doha Declaration appears to be that, for the moment, the
risks of upsetting the delicate balance already achieved outweigh any
need for further clarification.
The above analysis, which demonstrates that the WTO acquis
already affords ample deference to a precautionary approach,
supports this perspective. Under the existing rules, as interpreted and
applied by the SAB, WTO Members have wide discretion to adopt
measures for the protection of health, safety, or the environment on
the basis of precaution, despite a lack of full scientific certainty
concerning the risks that the measures in question target. As part of
184. See generally Precautionary Communication, supra note 130 (discussing
the EU's approach to greater endorsement of the precautionary principle).
185. EUApproach, supra note 155, at 14.
2002] 947
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
the WTO acquis, the Appellate Body rulings on this matter create
legitimate expectations for all WTO Members.
8 6
Entering into the new round of WTO negotiations, developing
countries have benefited both from the decision not to strengthen the
deference given to a precautionary approach under the WTO rules,
and from the decisions to improve implementation of the existing
rules concerning SPS measures. In particular, the equivalence
guidelines should aid developing countries' efforts to improve access
for exports to the markets of developed countries.
Overall, the decisions made at the start of the new round of WTO
negotiations reflect a general interest in ensuring that 1) government
measures to reduce societal risks with regard to health, safety, or the
environment deviate as little as possible from WTO rules, and 2)
when such measures are justified, the disruption of trade flows is
minimal. This approach appears to reflect a conviction that freer
trade flows promote innovation and the development of new
technologies, which in turn provide new capacities for dealing with
risks to health and the environment.'87  Given their current
disadvantage in terms of capacities, developing countries in
particular should benefit from these freer trade flows. Developing
countries' support of the Main Doha Declaration appears to confirm
that they share this belief.
186. See U.S. - Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 34, paras. 108-09
(stating that previously adopted Appellate Body reports , just as adopted panel
reports, create legitimate expectations among WTO members).
187. An issue exists whether freer trade leads to the creation of more serious
risks than are created by technologies that improve the capacity to deal with risks.
One approach is to say that technologies are developing anyway and freer
international trade is merely allowing broader access. While this ignores a
geographical containment aspect of risk management-by narrowing access, risks
may be easier to manage-containment can be achieved in various ways and, in
particular, in ways that avoid unnecessary, arbitrary, or unjustifiable restrictions on
trade.
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ANNEX A
BASIC ELEMENTS OF RISK ANALYSIS
A structured approach to the analysis of risk can be said to
comprise three elements: risk assessment, risk management, and risk
communication.1
8
The risk assessment element involves an evaluation of an existing
risk exposure. To be complete, a risk assessment should not only
identify and assess a degree of risk, but it should also identify
measures already in place or being taken to reduce that risk, and
evaluate both the remaining degree of risk and the degree of risk that
would remain in the event various additional measures were applied,
whether alternatively or cumulatively.' 9 Thus, the risk assessment
should provide data concerning both the current and probable future
level of risk, with and without the application of additional
measures. 1
90
In the risk management phase, a decision is made on the basis of
the risk assessment as to whether further measures must be taken to
reduce net exposure. This requires a political judgment as to whether
the remaining (net) level of risk (prior to the application of additional
measures) is acceptable in the context of overall societal priorities
and available resources. If further measures are deemed necessary,
there is then a further decision-to the extent there is a choice-
about which additional measures to take.' 9'
This process is normally reviewed and repeated because
circumstances change: risks develop; existing measures become
inadequate or excessive over time; additional risk reduction measures
become technically feasible; and the actor's priorities, resources, and
acceptance of risks evolve. 
92
188. See, e.g., Precautionary Communication, supra note 130, at 2 (stating the
elements of a structured risk analysis). See also OECD Biotechnology Report,
supra note 15.
189. See generally, WTO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
Summary Report on the SPS Risk Anaysis H'orkshop, GISPS/GEN/209, at 3-5
(Nov. 3, 2000) (discussing the fundamentals of risk analysis).
190. See id.
191. See id. at 4 (detailing the steps taken after the risk assessment phase).
192. See id. (indicating that the process is often repeated).
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